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The black-mustachlo'd face gazed down from every commanding
comer. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption said.
In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down between the roofs, hovered
for an instant like a bluebottle, and darted away again with a curving
flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people's windows.1
I. Introduction
As society's concern about the crime rate has risen, police have used
increasingly sophisticated technology to combat criminals.2 At the same
time, the United States Supreme Court has expanded the types of technology
that the government may use without a warrant.3 Thus, citizens of the
United States are torn between their need to keep their neighborhoods safe
and the erosion of their privacy rights.4
The technology of remote sensing devices exemplifies tins tension
between the desire for safety and the right to privacy 5 Police departments
across the country commonly employ the infrared scanner, or Forward
1. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949), quoted in Florida v Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. See David E. Steinberg, Sense-Enhanced Searches: The Limitations of Warrant
Clause Analysis and a Proposal for Change, 17 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP 41, 41 (1990)
(discussing increasing police use of sense-enhancing technological devices).
3. See Lisa J. Steele, Waste Heat and Garbage: The Legalization of Warrantless
Infrared Searches, 29 CRIM L. BULL. 19, 19 (1993) (noting that Supreme Court has allowed
use of increasing numbers of technological tools).
4. See id. (explaining that average citizens must "watch their rights slowly eroding in
the name of law and order"); see also United States v Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205, 207-08
(E.D. Tex. 1994) (explaining tension between right to privacy and increasing technological
sophistication and stating that "war on drugs" should not erode fundamental rights), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995); Ellen Alperstem, Aerial Protection or Just High-Flying
Harassment?, L.A. TIMEs, July 26, 1987, Magazine, at 27 (noting ambivalence of one
citizen, who stated in reference to patrol by police helicopters, "they are helpful, but some-
times it feels like a police state"). One zealous police officer evoked the potential abuses of
the Forward Looking Infrared Device (FLIR) in the name of law and order when he said "It's
a very neat tool for us. We can survey all kinds of things without letting people know
we're surveying them." Lynn O'Shaughnessy, Heat Image on Infrared Scope Led to Hiker's
Body, L.A. TIMs, Sept. 7, 1987, at 6; see State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 600 (Wash. 1994)
(en banc) (noting that unrestricted, sense-enhanced observations provide dangerous amount
of police discretion); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that "[tihe right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized").
5. Ishmael, 843 F Supp. at 207-08 (noting tension between right to privacy and
increasing technological sophistication used in "war on drugs").
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Looking Infrared Device (FLIR).6 Originally developed by the military, the
FLIR detects and tracks targets through infrared light rays.7 Users generally
mount the device on a helicopter or plane.8 The FLIR transforms the differ-
ences in the surface temperature of the scanned area electromcally into a
black and white visual image: Hotter objects appear white in contrast to cool
areas, which are dark.9 Some versions of the FLIR that the police use are
sensitive enough to pick up temperature differentials of as little as 0.02
degrees Celsms10 and produce an image in various shades of grey " The
FLIR can produce a remarkably clear image, at times having great defim-
tion" and revealing exact details. 3 However, atmospheric conditions14 or
ambient temperature can affect the image's quality 15 For these reasons,
among others, courts have not accepted the FLIR image as definitive in the
unique identification of remote objects, such as distinguishing one DC-3
airplane from another,1 6 although courts have accepted the device for the
6. See Alperstem, supra note 4, at 27 (noting that police helicopter patrols are major
civilian consumer of military surveillance hardware).
7 See United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing use and
technology of FLIR device).
8. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 223 (D. Haw. 1991)
(discussing use of FLIR), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.
1993).
9. See Kilgus, 571 F.2d at 509 (discussing use and technology of FLR device).
10. See Paul Valentine, Putting the Heat on Crime at Night: State Police Helicopters
Use Infrared Cameras to Detect Wrongdoers, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1993, Howard Weekly,
at 1, 4 (reporting comment of state trooper using FLIR device to scan house for excessive
heat).
11. See Kilgus, 571 F.2d at 509 (discussing use and technology of FLIR device).
12. See Bill Bleyer, On the Water Chopper's Special Set of Eyes, NEWSDAY, Jan. 2,
1994, at 23 (noting that FLIR can provide definition of "videotape shot m daylight").
13. See Charles Stanley, Infrared Tool Helps Cops Stay Out of Dark, CH. TRiB., July
26, 1994, at 3 (noting infrared scanning device revealed detail such as "eyeglasses and facial
hair"); see also William P Coughlin, Fisherman Falls Into Rough Seas; Search Halted,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1987, at 19 (stating infrared device revealed "seagull heads"); Greg
Johnson, Defense Firms Jockey to Build Pilotless Aircraft, L.A TIMES, Sept. 8, 1992, at D2,
D12 (quoting awed observer stating that FUR images were so detailed they were spectacu-
lar).
14. See United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) (discussing use and
technology of FLIR device).
15. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 4, at 6 (stating that daytime heat interferes with
image because entire background emits heat).
16. See KIgus, 571 F.2d at 509-10 (discussing limitations of evidentiary value of FLIR
reading). The Kilgus court noted, however, that the FLIR could readily distinguish differing
types of airplanes. Id. at 509
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generic identification of objects.17 In addition, the FLIR cannot create a
precise image when a solid object that conducts very little heat blocks the
infrared rays.18 However, the walls and roof of a structure often will transmit
enough heat to show grey or white on the FLIR image, thereby indicating that
a heat source exists inside the structure.' 9 The FLIR can also detect body heat
through a curtain or a thin partition.'m
Despite its limitations, the FLIR has proven to be a very useful tool.
21
The government and the private sector have already used the FUR to spot
hunters using illegal spotlights," to find bodies hudden under rubble" or
missing in the wilderness,' to find defective equipment on power transmission
lines,' to track down illegal immugrants,' to assist in routine police sur-
17 See United States v Sanchez, 829 F.2d 757, 758-759 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Kilgus
opimon for proposition that, with proper foundation, one can use FLIR for generic identifica-
tion).
18. See Valentine, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that FLIR camera "can't see through
things").
19. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 223-24 (D. Haw. 1991)
(discussing use of FLIR device), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cir. 1993).
20. See State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (discussing capabili-
ties of FLIR device).
21. Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 223 n.4 (noting that government and private sector
have used infrared devices for various purposes including finding missing persons, identifying
inefficient building insulation, detecting hot, overloaded power lines, and detecting forest fire
lines through smoke). The FLIR may one day provide such novel amenities as night vision
and accident avoidance systems in cars. See Monique P Yazigi, Group Working on Car
Features to Prevent Accidents, STAR TRIBUNE, Sept. 26, 1992, at 03M (discussing advances
in car safety and comfort); David Kushma, Hughes Acquisition Proves High-Tech Coup,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 14, 1987, at 1A (discussing advances in technology at Hughes
Aircraft Co.).
22. Robert Fachet, Some Deer Hunters Jumping the Gun, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1993,
at D2 (discussing pursuit of deer hunters using illegal spotlights).
23. See Malcolm Gladwell, Police Say Blast Had to Be Bomb, WASH. POST, Feb. 28,
1993, at Al, A12 (stating government used thermal anagmg cameras to look for bodies in
rubble after World Trade Center bombing).
24. See Bleyer, supra note 12, at 23 (discussing use of FLIR to find missing boater);
Coughlin, supra note 13, at 19 (discussing use of FLIR to find lost fisherman); O'Shaughn-
essy, supra note 4, at 6 (discussing successful search for body of strayed hiker).
25. See Michigan Memo; Infrared Inspection, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Nov 25, 1993,
at 2F (discussing power company's use of infrared devices to find worn splices and connec-
tions and defective switches).
26. See Ann S. Tyson, Chinese Smuggling Rings Resurge, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 10, 1991, at 4 (discussing Hong Kong's use of infrared devices to detect illegal Chinese
immigrants).
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veillance, z to discover suspects m hding,2 and to find structures that emit
excess heat, possibly housing marijuana-growing operations.29 This Note
addresses the Fourth Amendment problems raised by use of the FLIR to find
marijuana-growing operations.
Part II.A reviews cases that have held that the warrantless use of an
infrared scanning device to determine whether a house emits excessive heat
does not constitute an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.' Part H.B addresses two cases that have held that the warrantless use
of a thermal scanning device does violate the Fourth Amendment.31 Part ][m
examines the law underlying the analysis of what constitutes an inpermissible
search and considers whether warrantless thermal surveillance violates the
27 See Stanley, supra note 13, at 3 (discussing police department's use of car-mounted
infrared devices m routine surveillance by patrol car).
28. See O'Shaughnessy, supra note 4, at 6 (discussing sheriff department's use of FLIR
to detect suspects "lurking m doorways or hiding m trees").
29. See, e.g., United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 993 (11th Cir. 1994) (involving
agents' use of FLIR to reveal excessively hot floor and walls of mobile home that they later
found contained marijuana-growing operation); United States v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057
(8th Cir.) (involving government's use of FLIR to reveal excessively hot roof, skylight, and
window of residence that government later found contained marijuana-growing operation),
cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United States v Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205, 208 (E.D.
Tex. 1994) (involving officers' use of FLIR to reveal excessively hot brush pile and metal
building that they later found contained marijuana-growing operation), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 75 (1995); United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 223-24 (D. Haw. 1991)
(involving police's use of FLIR to reveal excessively hot garage that they later found con-
tamed extensive marijuana-growing operation), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984
F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (en bane)
(involving detective's use of FLIR to reveal excessively hot foundation of residence that they
later found contained quantity of marijuana).
30. See United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.) (holding that police's
warrantless use of FLIR device was not search in violation of Fourth Amendment because
defendant failed to show that subjective expectation of privacy was one society would find
objectively reasonable), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United States v Penny-Feeney,
773 F Supp. 220, 226-28 (D. Haw. 1991) (holding that officers' warrantless use of FLR
device was not search in violation of Fourth Amendment because defendants did not show
subjective expectation of privacy, and if defendants did show subjective expectation of
privacy, society would not find expectation reasonable), aff'd sub nom. United States v
Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
31. SeeUnited States v. Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205,212-13 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
that defendants had reasonable expectation of privacy in building and that officers' use of
FLIR without warrant was search in violation of Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 75 (1995); State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 604 (Wash. 1994) (en bane) (holding that
officers' warrantless scan with FLIR device was search in violation of Fourth-Amendment
because device obtained information about interior of defendant's home that police could not
obtain by unaided observation of exterior of home).
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Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part IV reviews some options for legislatures
and courts in dealing with tis problem and proposes a practical approach for
states to take in addressing the FLIR problems.
II. The Debate
A. Cases Holding That a Warrantless Infrared Scan Is Not a
Prohibited Search
1 United States v Penny-Feeney
The earliest and most influential case holding that warrantless thermal
scanning for marijuana-growing operations does not violate the Fourth
Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches is United States v Penny-
Feeney,32 which courts have followed in a substantial number of cases.33
Penny-Feeney involved two defendants indicted on three counts of federal
drug and firearm violations. The investigation leading to the indictment
began in 1988, when the police received a tip that one defendant, Jan Penny,
had sold drugs in California and continued to sell drugs in Hawaii.35 In
1989, the police obtained a search warrant to open a package mailed to
32. 773 F Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991).
33. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991)
(holding that officers' warrantless use of FLIR device was not search in violation of Fourth
Amendment), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); see,
e.g., United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995-97 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that warrantless
thermal scanning did not violate Fourth Amendment); United States v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056,
1058-59 (8th Cir.) (holding that warrantless thermal scanning did not violate Fourth Amend-
ment), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 664 (1994); United States v Domitrovich, 852 F Supp. 1460,
1472-75 (E.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that warrantless thermal scanning did not violate Fourth
Amendment), aff'd, 57 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v Porco, 842 F Supp 1393,
1396-98 (D. Wyo. 1994) (same), aff'd sub nom. United States v Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497
(10th Cir. 1995); United States v Deaner, No. 1:CR-92-0090-01 and -02, 1992 WL 209966,
at *2-4 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 1992) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 1 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1993);
United States v Kyllo, 809 F Supp. 787, 791-92 (D. Or. 1992) (same), aff'd in part,
vacated and remanded in part, 37 F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding Fourth
Amendment issue); State v Cramer, 851 P.2d 147, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
warrantless thermal scanning did not violate Fourth Amendment); State v McKee, 510
N.W.2d 807, 808-10 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (same), review denied, 515 N.W.2d 715 (Wis.
1994). Ford and Pinson are the only cases in which federal courts of appeals have decided
the issue. Ford, 34 F.3d at 995-97; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59. In Ford, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of the court m Penny-
Feeney, Ford, 34 F.3d at 995-97, as did the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in Pinson. Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1058-59.
34. Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 221.
35. Id.
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Penny 36 The package contained $2,700 in cash. 7 A trained dog detected
traces of narcotics on the money '8 Another anonymous informant called the
police department approximately eight months later and stated that Penny
was operating a large-scale, marijuana-growing operation in Penny's
house.39 An informant corroborated flus information.' ° The informant
described the layout of the growing area inside the garage, the powerful,
continuously running grow lights, the ventilation of the area by means of an
air conditioner at the back of the garage, and the drainage of water out the
back of the garage that made the grass greener behind the garage than
elsewhere on the property 41 The informant stated that Penny recently had
married Sean Feeney, and the informant presumed that the couple lived on
profits from the marijuana-growing operation. 42
Police then attempted to corroborate the informant's testimony '4 An
officer drove by the suspects' house and confirmed the informant's descrip-
tion of the house and cars, the green grass behind the garage, the location of
a shed that seemed to conceal the air conditioning unit, and the presence of
cars registered to people that the informant described as accomplices.' To
obtain further confirmation, the officer arranged to fly over the house in a
FLIR-equipped helicopter at a height between 300 and 600 feet above the
ground.4' When viewed with the naked eye - without the FLIR - the
house appeared dark.' With the aid of the FLIR, however, the walls and
other areas of the garage registered as bright white, indicating a strong
artificial heat source within the garage.47 The officer later testified that this
type of reading was consistent with the use of grow lamps for, among other
things, marijuana production. 48 Based on the results of the previous search





41. Id. at 222 & n.3.
42. Id. at 222-23.
43. Id. at 223-24.
44. Id. at 223.
45. See id. at 223 & n.5. The Penny-Feeney court characterized the FLIR as a "pas-
sive, non-intrusive instrument" that sends no "beams or rays into the area on which it is
fixed" and does not in any way "penetrate" the area. Id. at 223.
46. Id. at 223.
47 Id. at 223-24.
48. Id. at 224.
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of the package mailed to Penny, the informants' testimony, the officer's
visual observation, and the FLIR reading, a judge issued a warrant to search
the house.49, The police carried out the search and found evidence of an
extensive marijuana-growing operation.' °
At trial, the defendants made a motion to suppress the physical evidence
seized pursuant to the 1989 warrant to search Penny's package and the 1990
warrant to search the defendants' house.51 The defendants argued that to the
extent that the judge based the 1990 warrant on the FLIR scan, the judge
based the warrant on illegally obtained information.' The defendants
contended specifically that a warrantless scan with an infrared device was a
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.5"
a. The Katz Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Test
The district court rejected the defendants' argument and held that the
use of an infrared device in airspace above the defendants' residence was not
a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 54 To reach this
conclusion, the district court applied the test that the Supreme Court set forth
in Katz v United States.5' Kat 6 supplanted the "trespass" doctrine that the
49. Id. To avoid confusion, this Note will follow the lead of the court and refer to the
earlier warrant as the "1989 warrant" and to the later warrant as the "1990 warrant." Id. at
222 n.2.
50. Id. at 224.
51. See id. at 224-25 (noting that defendants sought suppression of evidence seized pur-
suant to both warrants, but because bulk of motion pertained to 1990 warrant, court addressed
that issue first). This Note will address only the arguments and analysis that concern the 1990
warrant, because the 1989 warrant did not involve the use of a FLIR device. See id. at 221-
22 (describing grounds for 1989 search warrant). However, the Penny-Feeney court con-
sidered the admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to the 1989 warrant as well. See id. at
229-30 (finding that issuing judge had substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed
for limitea search of parcel addressed to Jan Penny and alternatively that evidence was admis-
sible under "good faith exception" to exclusionary rule).
52. Id. at 225.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 228. The Penny-Feeney court also held that there was probable cause to
support the warrant independent of the FLIR evidence. Id. at 229.
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
56. Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, the Supreme Court of the
United States considered Katz's contention that recordings of telephone conversations
obtained by attaching an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of a phone
booth were inadmissible in court because they were obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 348-49. The Court rejected the parties' formulation of the issue, which
relied on whether the phone booth was a "constitutionally protected area," and stated that the
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Court had established m Olmstead v United States,' a doctrine stating that
searches during which the government committed an actual physical invasion
violated the Fourth Amendment. 8 The Katz test, explained m Justice Har-
protection of the Fourth Amendment did not turn on the characterization of the place in which
the search occurred. Id. at 349-51. The Court concluded that one who occupies a phone
booth and pays the toll is surely entitled to assume his words are private. Id. at 352. The
Court also rejected the idea that the reach of the Fourth Amendment depended on the
"presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at 352-53. In
doing so, the Court explicitly rejected the contrary holding of Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928). Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. The Government stated that its surveil-
lance was limited in scope and duration and was only undertaken after previous investigation
had established a strong probability of Katz's illegal conduct. Id. at 354. The Government
argued that because its search was so narrowly tailored, it could have been given prior judi-
cial sanction; also, because the Government had relied on Olmstead, the Court should retro-
actively validate the Government's conduct. Id. at 354-56. The Court declined to do this and
noted that any restraint exercised by the Government was entirely at the Government's own
discretion rather than imposed by court order. Id. at 356-57 The Court reasoned that courts
should not allow the Government to bypass the important safeguards of a warrant. Id. Jus-
tice Harlan's concurring opinion stated what has become the commonly accepted test of Katz.
See infra note 59 and text accompanying notes 59-62 (discussing Justice Harlan's articulation
of Katz test and its subsequent adoption by other courts). The Katz test to determine the reach
of the Fourth Amendment, as expressed by Justice Harlan, requires that a person exhibit an
actual, subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation be one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable. Katz, 349 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
57 277 U.S. 438 (1928); see Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (1967) (noting that trespass doc-
trine of Olmstead had been so eroded that Court could no longer regard O/mstead as con-
trolling); see also United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991)
(citing Katz for proposition that Supreme Court abandoned trespass doctrine), aff'd on other
grounds, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
58. See Olmstead v United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928) (holding that wire-
tapping without physical invasion of defendants' property did not amount to search or seizure
within meaning of Fourth Amendment). In Olmstead, the Supreme Court of the United States
considered whether the use of evidence of private telephone conversations intercepted by
means of wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 455, 462. The government
carried out the wiretapping without any physical invasion of the defendants' property. Id. at
457 The defendants apparently urged that wiretapping was analogous to opening a sealed
letter in the mail, which the Court had held to be within the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Id. at 464. However, the Court rejected that argument and stated that the Fourth
Amendment applied only to physical seizure of "material things - the person, the house, Ins
papers or his effects." Id. The Court then found that because wiretapping is secured only
by hearing it did not fall within the definition of a material thing. See id. Reasoning that the
language of the Amendment limited protection to material things, the Court declined to ex-
pand the protection of the Fourth Amendment to the "intervening [telephone] wires" reaching
from defendants' houses and offices to the world. Id. at 464-65. The Court further held that
the fact that the mode of obtaining the information was unethical and a misdemeanor under
Washington law did not render the evidence inadmissible. Id. at 466-69.
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lan's concurring opinion,59 requires, first, that the person involved exhibit
an actual, subjective expectation of privacy under the circumstances.'
Second, the expectation of privacy must be one society will recognize as
reasonable.6' If these conditions are met, the Fourth Amendment protects
against the warrantless search.62
In applying the Katz test, the Penny-Feeney court characterized the
FLIR's target as waste heat, because the device only detected heat that
emanated from the house and the defendants made no attempt to contain the
heat, attempting instead to vent It. 63 The Penny-Feeney court thus charac-
terized the first issue under the Katz test as whether the defendants had
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in this waste heat.' The
Penny-Feeney court concluded that the defendants had no actual expectation
of privacy in this waste heat because they voluntarily exposed the heat to
the public and did not try to prevent it from escaping. 65 The Penny-Feeney
court then addressed the next prong of the Katz test and concluded that
even if the defendants had manifested an actual expectation of privacy in
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, argued that technical advances in the government's ability
to view the secrets of the public made it necessary to expand the literal language of the Con-
stitution to protect the public from unanticipated invasions of individual security. Id. at 472-
74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis also stated that essentially no difference
existed between sealed mail and the telephone and noted that the Supreme Court had often
refused to adhere strictly to the literal language of the Constitution. Id. at 475-77 There-
fore, Brandeis concluded that the wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
the lack of physical intrusion. Id. at 477-79. Justice Brandeis also concluded that the fact
that wiretapping was a crime m Washington rendered the evidence inadmissible. Id. at 479-
85; see also Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 225 (citing Olmstead for proposition that viola-
tion of Fourth Amendment required physical invasion).
59. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT § 2.1(b), at 306 (2d ed. 1987) (noting that courts, including Supreme Court, have come
to rely on Justice Harlan's explanation of Katz test in his concurring opinion).
60. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-61 (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining test that deter-
mines when action of government violates Fourth Amendment).
61. See id., see also Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 225 (stating Katz test).
62. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991) (ex-
plaining that, under Katz, when person establishes subjective and reasonable expectation of
privacy, that person has legitimate expectation of privacy in item or space, and Fourth
Amendment protects item or space from warrantless search), aff'd on other grounds, 984
F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 226.
65. See id. (stating that defendants "voluntarily vented [the heat] outside the garage
where it could be exposed to the public and in no way attempted to impede its escape or exer-
cise dominion over it").
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the heat, society was not prepared to find that expectation of privacy
reasonable.'
b. Analogy of Waste Heat to Garbage
The Penny-Feeney court analogized the waste heat that the FLIR
detected to garbage left on the curb outside of a residence.6' The Penny-
Feeney court noted that the Supreme Court, m California v Greenwood,
68
had found that, because the general public had knowledge that anyone had
access to garbage left on the side of a public street, society would not accept
as reasonable a privacy interest in garbage left for collection. 69 The court in
66. Id. at 226-28.
67 Id. at 226.
68. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
69. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991) (citing
Greenwood for proposition that society will not accept as objectively reasonable expectation
of privacy m plastic garbage bags left outside home), aff'd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 1053
(9th Cir. 1993); see also California v Greenwood, 486 U.S. 37, 40-41 (1987) (stating that
defendant sufficiently exposed garbage to public so that defendant had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy m items discarded because garbage on public street was readily accessible to
"anmals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public"). In Greenwood,
the United States Supreme Court considered whether the warrantless search and seizure of
the garbage bags left outside the defendant's home violated the Fourth Amendment. Green-
wood, 486 U.S. at 39. To determine whether the search of the garbage bags violated the
Fourth Amendment, the Court applied the Katz test. Id. The Court concluded that the
defendant might have had a subjective expectation of privacy in his garbage but that society
was not prepared to accept that expectation as reasonable. Id. at 39-41. The Court rejected
the defendant's argument that an expectation of privacy in garbage should be deemed
reasonable because the warrantless search and seizure of the defendant's garbage was imper-
missible under California law. Id. at 43. The Court reasoned that whether or not a search
is reasonable depends not on state law but on the broad societal understanding. Id. at 43-44.
The Court also rejected the defendant's argument that California's elimination of an exclu-
sionary rule for evidence seized m violation of state, but not federal, law violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 44-45.
The dissent, written by Justice Brennan, concluded that the defendant did have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the defendant's garbage, or at least a reasonable expecta-
tion that the government would not search the garbage. Id. at 46-49 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). Brennan reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protects all containers used for
transport and that it made no difference that the defendant used these containers for disposal.
Id. Brennan also noted that most people would be revolted to find someone going through
trash that would reveal intimate details of their daily lives. Id. at 50-52. Brennan further
stated that the possibility that dogs or scavengers might tear open trash bags did not make the
expectation of privacy in their contents less reasonable. Id. at 53-54. Finally, the fact that
the defendant relinquished control over the trash did not mean he relinquished his expectation
of privacy Id. at 54-55.
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Penny-Feeney stated that waste heat also involved the disposal of waste
matter in public areas.7' The court concluded that it was irrelevant that
police could inspect garbage visually but had to use a heat-sensing device
like the FLIR to detect waste heat.71
c. Analogy of FLIR to Canine Sniff
The Penny-Feeney court also analogized the FLIR to several other
devices that police may use without first obtaining a warrant.' Police have
used devices to record numbers that a private residence called,73 beepers
70. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 226 (noting that disposal of waste heat involved
homeowner's disposing of waste in public -areas and reasoning that because defendants
attempted to vent heat from garage, waste heat was exactly like garbage in Greenwood).
71. See id. (dismssing without explanation argument that because naked eye could not
detect heat it was not "exposed" in same way that garbage is "exposed" when placed on curb
for collection).
72. See id. at 226-27 (noting that "[ltime and again, the United States Supreme Court
has held that police utilization of extra-sensory, non-intrusive equipment, such as the FLIR,
to investigate people and objects does not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment").
73. See id. at 226 (citing Smith v Maryland for proposition that government's placing
device with telephone company to determine what phone numbers were called by private resi-
dence was not search within meaning of Fourth Amendment); see also Smith v Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that petitioner probably had no actual expectation of
privacy in phone numbers dialed, and if petitioner did, expectation was not legitimate; conse-
quently, use of pen registers to record numbers was not "search"). In Smith, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the warrantless installation and use of a "pen
register" to record numbers dialed from a private home was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 736. The telephone company, at police request, installed a
pen register at its offices to record numbers called from the defendant's home because the
police suspected the defendant of placing obscene phone calls to the victim of a robbery Id.
at 737 The defendant argued that the trial court should have suppressed evidence seized
pursuant to the warrantless installation of the pen register. Id. The Smith Court defined the
challenged state activity as the installation of the pen register and explained that the Katz test
determined whether the installation violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 739-41. The
Court noted that the defendant's argument amounted to a claim that he had a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed and that therefore he met the second prong
of the Katz test. Id. at 742. The Court rejected his argument and instead found that the
defendant probably had no actual expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed, because
everyone must furimsh numbers to the telephone company to place calls. Id. at 742-43.
Furthermore, even if the defendant had some subjective expectation of privacy, the Court
held that society would not recognize the expectation as reasonable, because the defendant
voluntarily turned the information over to the telephone company and assumed the risk that
the numbers would be turned over to someone else. Id. at 743-45. The defendant further
argued that because the telephone company usually does not elect to record local numbers,
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to track cars,74 and have trained drug-sniffing dogs to detect odors. 5 Of
he had a legitimate expectation of privacy Id. at 745. The Court declined to make Fourth
Amendment protection dependent on the "billing practices of a private corporation." Id. at
745-46.
Justice Stewart dissented and stated that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed because they arose from private conduct in a person's home
and were an integral part of an otherwise protected communication. Id. at 746-48 (Stewart,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also dissented and stated that people do not as a rule expect
that the numbers they call will be recorded. Id. at 748-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Mar-
shall further stated that the majority's conclusion that the defendant assumed the risk was
flawed because the defendant had no choice but to turn over the numbers, and a risk analysis
would allow the government to define Fourth Amendment analysis by putting the public on
notice of the risks of disclosure. Id. at 749-51.
74. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991) (citing
United States v. Knotts for proposition that government's placing beeper in container to track
vehicle to remote cabin was not search), aff'd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir.
1993); see also United States v Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that monitoring
of beeper signals from container in car did not invade legitimate expectation of privacy and
thus was not search or seizure within scope of Fourth Amendment). In Knotts, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the use of a beeper to monitor the location and final
destination of a five gallon drum of chloroform being transported m a car was a search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 277 The government used visual surveillance
and the beeper to trace the drum of chloroform to a secluded cabin, but police did not use the
beeper after determining the drum's location m or near the cabin. Id. at 278-79. The Court
applied the Katz test to determine whether the use of the beeper violated the Fourth Amend-
ment. Id. at 280-85. The Knotts Court noted that the driver of the car had a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy than the owner of the cabin, so the beeper did not violate the driver's legiti-
mate expectation of privacy when used to track the car. Id. at 281-82. The Court concluded
that the use of the beeper did not transform what would otherwise be pure visual surveillance
into a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 282-84. However, the defendant argued that the
use of the beeper to determine the location of the chloroform at the cabin violated the defend-
ant's expectation of privacy in his residence. Id. at 284. The Court found that the beeper
was not used in any way to determine any movement of the can of chloroform that could not
have been observed visually, as allowed by the "open fields" doctrine. Id. at 284-85.
Threejustices concurred. Id. at 285-88. Justice Brennan noted that the case would be
more difficult if the defendant had challenged the installation rather than the monitoring of
the beeper. Id. at 285-87 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun commented that the
Court unnecessarily invoked the open fields doctrine. Id. at 287 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens disagreed with two dicta in the Court's opinion: First, that the case involved
the open fields doctrine; second, that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the police from
augmenting the police's senses with technological devices. Id. at 288 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
But cf. United States v Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 711-18 (1984) (holding that installation
of beeper did not violate Fourth Amendment but that monitoring of beeper inside private
residence did). In Karo, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the installation
of a beeper or the monitoring of it within a private residence constituted a search in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 711, 714. First, the Court concluded that the installation
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of the beeper posed no Fourth Amendment concerns. Id. at 711-13. Second, the Court found
that monitoring the beeper without a warrant did violate the Fourth Amendment as it revealed
to the government crucial information about the interior of the house that the government
could not have obtained by visual surveillance. Id. at 713-15. Even the limited information
that the container with the beeper remained on the premises was enough to trigger the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 715. The Court distinguished Knotts on the ground that m that case,
the monitoring of the beeper told the government nothing about the interior of the cabin. Id.
The Court rejected the government's argument that the Court should allow the government
to use an electromc device to determine whether a particular article is in an individual's home
at a particular time. Id. at 716. The Court also rejected the government's contention that the
Court should deem warrantless beeper searches reasonable if justification exists to believe a
crime is being or will be committed. Id. at 717-18. The Court was also unpersuaded by
arguments that a warrant would be difficult to obtain. Id. at 718. Finally, the Court
concluded that the warrant the government did obtain for a physical search of the residence
was valid, because sufficient untainted evidence supported the warrant. Id. at 719-21.
Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, stated that a defendant would have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy only in those containers that were monitored when visual sur-
veillance was not possible and only in those containers the defendant owned or controlled
sufficiently to have standing to consent to or challenge a search. Id. at 724-28 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Justice Stevens also dissented in part and concurred in part. Stevens con-
cluded that the surreptitious use of a beeper on another's private property was both a search
and a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 728-36 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 226 (citing United States v Place for proposi-
tion that using drug-detection dog to sniff luggage at airport was not search); see also United
States v Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that exposure of defendant's luggage,
which was in public place, to trained canine was not search within meaning of Fourth Amend-
ment). In Place, the United States Supreme Court considered whether narcotics officers can
temporarily detain personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics dog on suspicion that
the luggage contains narcotics. Id. at 697-98. Police seized the defendant's bags and retained
them fbr approximately 90 minutes while presenting them to a trained dog who reacted posi-
tively to one bag. Id. at 698-99 As it was late on Friday, the police retained the luggage
until Monday morning. Id. at 699. After obtaining a warrant, police opened the bag and
found cocaine. Id. The Place Court held that the warrantless seizure of personal luggage for
the purposes of a limited investigation was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and was
an exception to the probable cause requirement. Id. at 699-702. The Court required only
that the government have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity Id. at 706. The Court
reasoned that the substantial government interest in discovering narcotics in the bags of
travelers outweighed the limited intrusion upon the individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
Id. at 703-06. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that though a limited stop of the
person is less intrusive than full arrest, no degrees of intrusion exist in the context of seizure
of property Id. at 705-06.
The Court concluded that the exposure of the bags to a narcotics dog was not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 706-07 The Court reasoned that the
"search" was limited in the scope of information that police obtained and was nonintrusive.
Id. at 707 Furthermore, the Court noted that it was "aware of no other investigative pro-
cedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the
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these devices that police may already use without a warrant, the court found
the drug-sniffing-dog analogy the most compelling. 6 The Penny-Feeney
court discussed the case of United States v Solis,7' m wich the police,
reacting to an informant's tip, went to the defendant's trailer to look for
marijuana." The police found talcum powder on the doors of the trailer79
and brought m a trained dog that sniffed at the doors and detected
marijuana."' The Solis court concluded that the sniff was not a prohibited
search.81 The court reasoned that the method did not embarrass anyone, the
defendants expected that the drug would give off an odor (as shown by their
attempt to conceal the odor with talcum powder), and the specific physical
evidence that the police looked for and found clearly indicated a possible
crime.' The Penny-Feeney court reasoned that the use of the FLIR m the
circumstances of the case was much like the. use of the trained dog m Solis
because the Penny-Feeney defendants knew that the heat the marijuana-
growing operation produced would exit the garage.' Moreover, the use of
content of the information revealed by the procedure." Id. Finally, the Court held that the
government's seizure of the defendant's bags was unreasonalile because the police retained
the luggage for too long and thus went beyond the government's narrow ability to seize
luggage for a limited investigation. Id. at 707-10.
76. See Umited States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991) (stating
that use of dog sniff is most analogous to use of FLIR), aff'd sub nom. United States v
Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
77 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
78. United States v Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 881 (9th Cir. 1976). In Solis, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the use of drug-sniffing
dogs was a prohibited search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. In Solis,
police used drug-sniffing dogs to detect marijuana in the. defendant's semi-trailer parked
behind a public gas station. Id. Reasoning that the government's use of the dogs was
inoffensive, did not embarrass the person, and revealed only a physical fact indicating a
crime, the Court held that the dog's intrusion was reasonable and therefore not a search. Id.
at 881-83.
79. Solis, 536 F.2d at 881. Drug offenders commonly use talcum powder to mask the
smell of marijuana. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 226 (discussing use of talcum
powder in Solis).
80. Solis, 536 F.2d at 881.
81. See Solis, 536 F.2d at 882 (holding that use of dogs was not prohibited search
because defendants expected odor would emanate from trailer, search method was moffen-
sive, officers did not search or embarrass person, and target was physical fact that indicated
crime); see also Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 227 (quoting Solis for proposition that use
of dogs was not prohibited search).
82. Solis, 536 F.2d at 882-83.
83. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 227 (D. Haw. 1991) (con-
cluding that government's use of FLIR to detect waste heat was in every way like govern-
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the FLIR did not embarrass the defendants or involve a bodily search, and
the heat physically indicated a possible crime. 
4
d. Analogy to Aerial "Plain View" Cases
Finally, the Penny-Feeney court concluded that the fact that the police
mounted the FLIR to a helicopter flying above the defendants' residence did
not make the defendants' expectation of privacy in the heat emanations
reasonable.' The Penny-Feeney court noted that, in Florida v Riley' and
California v Ciraolo,87 the United States Supreme Court had upheld the
observation of the area near a home from an airplane or helicopter flying in
public airspace. 88 In both cases, the Court relied on the fact that the ob-
ment's use of trained dogs to detect narcotics), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984
F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
87 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
88. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 227 (D. Haw. 1991) (dis-
cussing Court's holdings in Riley and Ciraolo), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984
F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Florida v Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (holding police observation of greenhouse from helicopter at 400 feet was not search
because observation did not violate reasonable expectation of privacy); California v Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding defendant's expectation that he had protected garden from
observation from air was not expectation society was prepared to honor as reasonable).
In Riley, the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether surveillance of the
interior of a partly covered greenhouse in a residential backyard from a helicopter at 400 feet
constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Riley, 488 U.S. at 447-
48. Relying on Ciraolo, the Court concluded that the police's nonintrusive observation of the
backyard from a helicopter flying where the helicopter had a right to be, according to FAA
regulations, did not invade a reasonable privacy expectation of the defendant. Id. at 449-52.
Justice O'Connor, concurring, commented that the plurality rested too heavily on compliance
with FAA regulations when the plurality should have relied on the routine nature of public
flights in the area and at the altitude in question. Id. at 452-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan dissented and stated that a police overflight at 400 feet was not a sufficiently
common public vantage point to render the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in
his backyard unreasonable. Id. at 456-61, 464-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan
also noted that the plurality's opinion placed few and illogical limits on the scope of permis-
sible vantage points. Id. at 461-64, 466-67 Justice Blackmun also dissented and noted that
whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy did not depend on the scope
of FAA regulations. Id. at 467-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). He concluded that the Court
should remand the case to determine whether public helicopter flights in the area at 400 feet
were routine. Id.
In Ciraolo, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the warrantless aerial
surveillance of a fenced-in backyard of a home violated the Fourth Amendment. Ciraolo, 476
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servation involved no physical mtrusion.' In Riley, the Court also noted
that the police have a right to see whatever is visible from a public vantage
point.' In Penny-Feeney, the court found that the police viewed the defend-
ants' house from a public vantage point and that the FLIR did not physically
invade the defendants' home.9" Consequently, the Penny-Feeney court
concluded that an overflight using a FLIR resembled the flights that the
Supreme Court found permissible in Riley and Ciraolo.2
2. United States v Pinson
In United States v Pinson,93 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that a warrantless infrared scan of the defendant's house
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 4 In Pinson, police suspected that the
defendant grew marijuana because the police received notice that suppliers
of hydroponics equipment had mailed packages to the defendant.95 Based on,
the packages and the defendant's abnormally Igh electrical usage, the police
decided to perform aerial thermal surveillance of the defendant's home.
96
The thermal scan detected excessive amounts of heat emanating from a
covered window, the roof, and a skylight. 7 Based in part on the thermal
scan, the police obtained a search warrant and arrested the defendant for
U.S. at 209. Applying the Katz test, the Court first concluded that the defendant had mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy from most observations of his yard. Id. at 211-12.
Reasoning that the yard was visible with the naked eye from public airspace, the Court next
concluded that the defendant's expectation of privacy was not one society was prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Id. at 212-14. The dissent argued that the Court's unplication that
the defendant knowingly exposed himself to observation from the air was flawed in that the
actual risk of such observation by an average citizen is slight. Id. at 222-24 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
89. Riley, 488 U.S. at 449. See Oraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-14 (explaining that officers
saw only what could be seen from public vantage point outside defendant's property).
90. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 449 (noting "police may see what may be seen 'from a public
vantage point where [they have] a right to be'") (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213).
91. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 227-28 (comparing overflight in instant case to
flights in Ciraolo and Riley and placing great emphasis on fact that beams of FLIR did not
physically invade defendants' home).
92. Id.
93. 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994).
94. See United States v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.) (holding that because
defendant's subjective expectation of privacy is not one that society finds objectively reason-
able, search did not violate Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994).
95. Id. at 1057
96. Id.
97 Id.
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growing and processing over 100 marijuana plants, a charge of which the
jury found the defendant guilty 98 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the
warrantless FLIR scan violated the Fourth Amendment. 9
The Pinson court followed the reasoning of the court in Penny-
Feeney 100 First, the Pinson court concluded that because the FLIR detected
only surface heat and did not invade the defendant's residence, it did not
constitute a search.I1 Second, the court stated that there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy in voluntarily vented heat.'12 Finally, the court con-
cluded that the FLIR resembled a drug-sniffing dog because police use each
sense-enhancing device to detect something otherwise invisible. 0 3
B. Cases Holding That a Warrantless Infrared Scan Is a
Prohibited Search
1 United States v Ishmael
In United States v Ishmael," 4 the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas addressed the issue of whether the warrantless scan
of the defendants' buildings with a thermal imaging device was a search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.I 5 The Ishmael defendants had pur-
chased a large amount of concrete and had begun a construction project on
a secluded area of property 106 After concluding that the defendants had built
a basement under the mobile home on the property, the police scanned the
property with an aerial FLIR device and found that a metal building and a
nearby brush pile were considerably hotter than their surroundings.'10 The
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1058-59 (discussing court's reasoning in Penny-Feeney and explicitly fol-
lowing that reasoning). First, the Pinson court very briefly summarized two analogies the
Penny-Feeney court used. Id. at 1058. Next, the Pinson court concluded n one paragraph
that the defendant did not meet the Katz expectation of privacy test. Id. at 1058-59. The
Pinson court based its conclusion that society would not recognize the defendant's expectation
of privacy as reasonable on the analogy of waste heat to garbage and to a canine sniff. Id.
101. See id. at 1058-59 (concluding that use of FLIR is not "search").
102. Id. (stating that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat that defendant
voluntarily vented).
103. Id. at 1058.
104. 843 F Supp. 205 (E.D. Tex. 1994), cert. denied, 166 S. Ct. 74 (1995).
105. See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205, 207-09 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
that warrantless FLIR scan violated Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 74 (1995).
106. Id. at 208.
107 Id.
1788
THERMAL SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 1789
police obtained a search warrant based in part on the scan and arrested the
defendants for the marijuana-growing operation that the police found on the
premises." s The defendants claimed that the warrantless FLIR scan violated
the Fourth Amendment. 1"
In addressing whether the scan violated the Fourth Amendment, the
Ishmael court applied the Katz test and found that the defendants had
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat vented from their
building."' Next, the Ishmael court found that society recognized the
defendants' expectation of privacy in the heat as reasonable."' The Ishmael
court noted that, in Ciraolo and Riley, the United States Supreme Court had
held that observations made with the naked eye from airplanes in normal
airspace were not searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 1
The Ishmael court also noted that in Dow Chemical Co. v United States,"'
the Supreme Court held that an overflight using a mapmaking camera did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.114 The Ishmael court recognized the Govern-
108. Id. at 209.
109. Id.
110. See id. (finding defendants manifested subjective expectation of privacy because
they located building out of sight m deep ravine and bought and mixed concrete themselves).
111. Id. at212.
112. Id. at 211-12; see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (discussing Ciraolo and
Riley).
113. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
114. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (holding that
taking of photographs with mapmaking camera did not violate Fourth Amendment, as camera
enhanced human vision only "somewhat"). In Dow, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the EPA's aerial photography of Dow's plant with a mapmaking camera
mounted on an airplane flying within navigable airspace was a search in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 229. Dow contended that the photographs violated the Fourth
Amendment because the EPA took photographs of the "industrial curtilage," and Dow had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in that area. Id. at 232-33. Dow conceded that photo-
graphs taken from a nearby hillside, or naked-eye observation from a simple flyover, would
be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 234. The Court first addressed Dow's
contention that the "industrial curtilage" around Dow's plant commanded the same constitu-
tional protection as the curtilage of a private home. Id. at 235. Dow contended that the
Court should regard Dow's 2,000 acre plant as industrial curtilage because Dow took all
reasonable precautions to prevent access from the ground level. Id. at 236. The Court con-
cluded that the plant area fell somewhere between "open 'fields" and curtilage with regard to
the privacy interest the Court would accord the plant area. d. at 236-37 The Court noted
that the government's surveillance of private property with highly sophisticated devices might
be constitutionally prohibited but concluded that the mapmaking camera that the EPA used
did not supply sufficient detail to raise constitutional concerns. Id. at 238-39. Because the
plant area did not command as high a privacy interest as a curtilage and the mapmaking
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ment's contention that the Dow Court's holding expanded permissible sur-
veillance beyond that visible to the naked eye.15 The Ishmael court stated,
however, that the holdings of Ciraolo, Riley, and Dow applied only to naked
eye observations or observations with technology that merely enhanced the
naked eye's vision slightly 116 Therefore the district court held that the
Fourth Amendment did not sanction observations made with the FLIR,
which enables the naked eye to see otherwise invisible heat.17 The court
also rejected the Government's contention, based on Penny-Feeney, that the
heat detected was waste heat and thus analogous to garbage because the
Government had to use high-technology devices to detect the heat.118 In
addition, the court rejected the Government's analogy of the FLIR to a
trained dog sniff because the FLIR detects a broader range of information at
a greater distance." 9 Therefore, the court held that the warrantless scan with
the FLIR device was a search that the Fourth Amendment barred. 12
2. State v Young
In State v Young,' the Supreme Court of Washington considered
whether a warrantless infrared surveillance of the defendant's home consti-
camera did not reveal too much intimate detail, the Court concluded that Dow did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy m protecting the plant area from aerial photographs of
this type. See id. at 235-39 (noting that Court has not recognized expectation of privacy in
activities conducted in "open fields" as reasonable and noting that camera did not reveal
intimate detail).
Justice Powell, joined by three other justices, concurred in part and dissented in part.
Id. at 240-252 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting m part). Justice Powell noted
that the majority did not explicitly follow the Katz analysis. Id. at 244, 247 Justice Powell
then applied the Katz test. Id. at 247-52. Justice Powell first concluded that trade secret laws
indicated that society will accept as reasonable Dow's privacy interest in its open air plant
area. Id. at 248-49. Justice Powell rejected as irrelevant the majority's reliance on the "open
fields" doctrine and the nature of the technology the EPA used to photograph Dow's plant.
Id. at 249-51. Justice Powell also criticized the majority's opinion for relying on the
"trespass" doctrine repudiated m Katz. Id. at 252. Because the photographs infringed on
Dow's expectation of privacy which society has recognized as legitimate, and because the
photographs captured sensitive information that Dow tried to conceal, the EPA's taking the
photographs without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
115. United States v Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205, 212 (E.D. Tex. 1994), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 75 (1995).
116. See id. at 211-12 (discussing "Fourth Amendment flyover cases").
117 Id.
118. Id. at 212-13.
119. Id. at213.
120. Id.
121. 867 P.2d 593 (Wash. 1994).
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tuted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment." The police began
investigating the defendant when the police received an anonymous note that
stated that the defendant operated a large marijuana-growing operation.
1 3
After observing the defendant's house and noting that the defendant's power
consumption records were abnormally high, the police scanned the defen-
dant's house with a thermal device." The device indicated that the base-
ment and other portions of the defendant's house were excessively hot.
25
The police obtained a warrant to search the house, discovered a marijuana-
growing operation, and arrested the defendant for possession of marijuana
with intent to manufacture or deliver." The defendant claimed that the
police's use of the thermal device constituted a search in violation of both the
state constitution and the Fourth Amendment."z First, the Young court
noted an individual's enhanced expectation of privacy in her home."
Second, the court addressed the government's contention that Penny-Feeney
represented the correct Fourth Amendment analysis." The Young court
examined Penny-Feeney but found the Penny-Feeney court's reasoning
unpersuasive. '0 The Young court noted that heat does not resemble garbage
because people do not voluntarilty vent heat like they dispose of garbage and
because heat reveals information about the interior of the home. 3 1 Finally,
the court concluded that the FLIR device did not resemble a dog sniff
because the dog sniff is distinct from other investigative methods in the
manner the evidence is obtained and in the information revealed." There-
122. See State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 594 (Wash. 1994) (en bane) (holding that war-
rantless FLIR search of defendant's home violated Fourth Amendment).




127 Id. at 594.
128. Id. at 601. The court compared Karo, see supra note 74 (discussing United States
v Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)), and Knotts, see supra note 74 (discussing United States v
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)) and noted that the difference m the two cases hinged on the
enhanced expectation of privacy in the home. The court stated that the FLIR device was at
least as intrusive as the beeper in Karo. Young, 867 P.2d at 601-02.
129. State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601-04 (Wash. 1994) (en banc).
130. Id. at 602-04.
131. Id. at 602-03.
132. See d. at 603-04 (noting that canine sniff differed from other investigative proce-
dures in manner of obtaining evidence and content of information revealed). The Young court
found the reasoning of United States v Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985), more persua-
sive than that of Solis. Id. at 603-04 (discussing Thomas court's holding and comparing it to
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fore, the Young court held that the police's warrantless use of the FLIR
constituted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.1
33
III. The Solution
A. A Critique of the Application of the Katz Test by Cases That
Follow Penny-Feeney
The Penny-Feeney line of cases relies heavily on Justice Harlan's test in
Katz."3 However, the facts of Katz indicate that the Penny-Feeney court came
to the wrong conclusion. In Katz, the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered whether the attachment of a listening device to a telephone booth con-
stituted a prohibited search under the Fourth Amendment. 35 The Court noted
that the Government claimed that it based the search on probable cause of
illegal activity and that it narrowly tailored the search to gather only infor-
mation that would further the investigation of the illegal activity 136 The Court
accepted these contentions, yet held that Katz had an actual and reasonable
expectation of privacy in hIs phone conversations in the telephone booth and
that the Constitution required that the government obtain a warrant.137
Solis); see supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of Solis);
In Thomas, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether the
police's use of a drug-sniffing dog to investigate defendant Wheelings's apartment violated
the Fourth Amendment. Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1365-67 The police used a trained dog to
sniff the doors of the defendant's apartment. Id. at 1367 The court held that the defendant
had a legitimate expectation of privacy that the contents of his closed apartment would remain
private. Id. The court limited United States v Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), which held that
a search by a drug-sniffing dog did not violate the Fourth Amendment, to airports or other
situations that did not involve a heightened expectation of privacy, unlike apartments.
Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367; see also supra note 75 (discussing Place).
133. Young, 867 P.2d at 601. The court's decision rested on the grounds that the scan
violated the Washington State Constitution but analyzed the Fourth Amendment issue as well.
Id.
134. See, e.g., United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting test
in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz); United States v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058
(8th Cir.) (citing test in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion m Katz), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
664 (1994); United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 225-26 (D. Haw. 1991) (dis-
cussing Katz holding generally and citing Justice Harlan's test), aff'd sub nom. United States
v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 2.1(b), at
306-08 (discussing importance of Katz test); supra notes 54-66 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Katz test generally and Penny-Feeney court's application of Katz test).
135. See Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349-54 (1967) (rejecting government's
definition of issues in case and defining issue as whether search complied with constitutional
standards); see also supra note 56 (discussing facts and holding of Katz).
136. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 354 (noting government's argument).
137 See id. at 354-59 (noting acceptance of government contentions and holding wiretap
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Penny-Feeney and its progeny fail to recognize that the facts of Katz
provide a better analogy to the police's use of the FLIR than garbage, dog-
sniff, or "plain view" cases."a Admittedly, the Katz Court did not provide
much guidance to lower courts that must determine when society will recog-
mze an expectation of privacy as reasonable.Y3 9 However, in both Penny-
Feeney and Katz, police used a nonintrusive device that made otherwise unde-
tectable information detectable."4 The police use of the FLIR looks slightly
more suspect than the government's use of the listening device m Katz. First,
a FLIR search, which indiscriminately picks up any heat emissions and by
necessity must scan neighboring houses, gathers a broader range of informa-
tion than the listening device in Katz. 4' Second, the FLIR searches the home,
m case required warrant, despite fact that overheard conversation was m phone booth and fact
that police had probable cause for warrant). For a discussion of the application of the "actual
and reasonable expectation of privacy test," consult Justice Harlan's concurrence. See id. at
361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing application of actual and reasonable expectation
of privacy test and concluding defendant had both actual and reasonable expectation of
privacy and therefore wiretap required warrant).
138. See, e.g., United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995-97 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Katz test but not using Katz as analogy); United States v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057-59 (8th
Cir.) (citing Katz test but not using Katz as analogy), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994);
United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 225-28 (D. Haw. 1991) (discussing Katz
holding generally and citing Katz test but not using Kafz as analogy), aff'd sub noma. United
States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
139. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurrng)
(discussing application of Katz test and stating m conclusory fashion that phone booth is "a
temporarily private place whose momentary occupants' expectations of freedom from mtru-
sion are recognized as reasonable"); see also id. at 352 (concluding m two sentences that "a
person m a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth Amendment"); 1
LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 2.1(b), at 307-08 (discussing Katz test's vagueness and difficulty
of application). Note, however, that both the Court and Justice Harlan rely on analogy. See
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (comparing phone booth to business office, friend's apartment, and
taxicab); id. at 361-62 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citing Rios taxicab case as comparable to
phone booth).
140. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (stating that government attached electromc listening
device to outside of phone booth to overhear defendant's telephone conversation); Penny-
Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 223-24 (noting that defendants' house was dark to the naked eye but
appeared as bright white and dark image with use of FLIR, indicating that heat was escaping
from home); see also Steele, supra note 3, at 24 (discussing nature of FLIR device and noting
that FLIR device allowed police to sense part of visual spectrum that eyes could not see "in
the same way that a geiger counter would have allowed them to tell if radioactive material
was located m the home").
141. See Umted States v Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205,213 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (comparing
canine sniff to FLIR use and noting that FLIR cannot distinguish between illegal heat and
legal heat, so that information from FLIR scan is less limited and more intrusive than dog
sniff), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995); Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 224 (noting that
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a place m which courts have commonly found that a person has the highest
expectation of privacy 142
The distinction that the Penny-Feeney line of cases has drawn between
the FLIR cases and Katz depends on the characterization of the object
searched.43 In the FLIR cases, the Penny-Feeney court and those courts that
followed Penny-Feeney have characterized the item searched as "waste heat,"
rather than as the heat patterns in the house.144 However, Katz was not con-
cerned with the expectation of privacy m the technical item intercepted but
with the expectation of privacy m the basic activity m which the defendant
was engaged. 45 Characterizing the object searched in Penny-Feeney as
"waste heat" is equivalent to characterizing the item m which Katz had an
expectation of privacy as sound waves, rather than as Katz's conversation. 14
The Katz Court did not separate the conversation that the police recorded from
government surveyed similar nearby structures for comparison with defendants' residence);
see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 354-55 & nn.14-15 (accepting government's contention that gov-
ernment's use of listening device was very narrowly tailored and stating that magistrate could
have constitutionally authorized very limited search and seizure that government conducted).
142. See Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurrmng)
(noting that home is area where person has constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy); id. at 351 n.8 (stating that courts commonly agree that private home is constitu-
tionally protected area); see also State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994) (en banc)
(discussing status of homes in federal constitutional jurisprudence); 1 LAFAv, supra note
59, § 2.3, at 378 (discussing protected nature of residential premises and stating courts have
viewed dwelling as area "most resolutely protected" by Fourth Amendment). But see Katz,
389 U.S. at 350-52 & n.9 (noting that defendant's attempt to characterize phone booth as
constitutionally protected area diverted attention from real issue and stating that whether area
was constitutionally protected was not solution to every Fourth Amendment problem).
143. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 225 (D. Haw. 1991) (stating
that application of Katz test required consideration of FLIR's target and examination of nature
of heat), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
144. See, e.g., United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that
FLIR scan targeted heat from home and that defendant treated heat as waste); United States
v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir.) (stating that FLIR device detected heat being cast
off or thrown away from defendant's home), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); Penny-
Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 225 (characterizing heat detected by FLIR as waste heat).
145. See Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (stating that defendant
sought to preserve privacy of words defendant spoke into telephone and that defendant had
reasonable expectation that those words would remain private). The Katz Court did not
analyze whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sound waves
that the defendant's conversation generated. Id.
146. See State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 602-03 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (noting that
police sought information about interior of defendant's home and valued information about
waste heat only because heat revealed information about interior of defendant's home critical
to government but not available otherwise).
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the sound waves that the conversation produced. 147 Therefore, the Penny-
Feeney line of cases incorrectly separated the information that the police
gamed about the activity mside of the home from the heat that the activity
generated."4 When the artificial "waste heat" distinction breaks down, the
defendants m the FLIR cases have at least as much of an expectation that the
government will not detect information about the interior of the defendants'
house or place of business as the Katz defendant had for his telephone
conversation. 149
Even if courts should define the defendants' expectation of privacy m
relation to the heat rather than the home, the defendants may still have a sub-
jective expectation of privacy m that heat. The Penny-Feeney line of cases
found that the defendants did not have a subjective expectation of privacy m
"waste heat" because the defendants tried to vent the heat.1" However, any
building will inevitably vent some heat.151 Therefore, the Penny-Feeney court
147 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (discussing nature of police's target, namely defend-
ant's telephone conversation).
148. See Young, 867 P.2d at 602-03 (suggesting Penny-Feeney court was incorrect in
stating that government sought information about heat rather than information about interior
of home).
149. See id. at 603-04 (stating that defendant had reasonable expectation that police
would not "use sense-enhancing devices to obtain information from [defendant's] home that
could not be obtained by unaided observation of the exterior"); see also 1 LAFAvE, supra
note 59, § 2.3(a), at 378 (noting that residential premises are places especially protected
against unreasonable government intrusion). Courts are likely to find a defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy m the home more reasonable than a defendant's expectation of privacy m other
places. Supra note 142 (citing cases m which courts recognized residences as most constitu-
tionally protected areas); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that
though Fourth Amendment protects persons, place is relevant to whether expectation of
privacy is reasonable). Admittedly, courts might be more likely to find reasonable the
defendant's expectation of privacy in Katz because the listening device delivered more
detailed information about Katz than the FLIR did about the lives of those searched.
Compare Katz, 389 U.S. at 348 (noting that police recorded defendant's conversation) and
Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 223 (noting that FLIR revealed heat patterns on structure's
surface) with United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 996 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that "the
intimacy of detail and activity that a surveillance technique reveals m a particular case" is "a
significant factor m the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis") and supra notes 10-13, 20 and
accompanying text (discussing detail FLIR can reveal).
150. See Ford, 34 F.3d at 995 (stating that defendant actively expelled excess heat from
his mobile home); United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991)
(stating that "defendants did not manifest an actual expectation of privacy m the heat waste
since they voluntarily vented it outside the garage where it could be exposed to the public and
in no way attempted to impede its escape or exercise dominion over it"-), aff'd sub nom.
United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
151. See Young, 867 P.2d at 602-03 (noting that heat automatically leaves home without
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wrongly applied Katz when it determined that a defendant's subJective
expectation of privacy should turn on whether a defendant attempted to direct
that heat or to regulate the heat m some areas and not in others."
B. A Critique of the Analogies Used by the Cases That
Follow Penny-Feeney
1. Garbage Cases
Even if one accepts the Penny-Feeney court's contention that the defend-
ants in FLIR cases must prove a reasonable expectation of privacy m waste
heat rather than m the defendants' homes to satisfy the Katz test, the Penny-
Feeney court still reached the wrong conclusion.' The Penny-Feeney court
relied on inappropriate analogies to prove that society will find unreasonable
any subjective expectation of privacy that the defendants might have."5 The
Penny-Feeney court argued that waste heat is similar to garbage placed on the
curb for collection. 55 That argument fails for two reasons. 56 First, the heat
any deliberate participation by homeowner).
152. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (assuming that defendant exhib-
ited actual, subjective expectation of privacy in conversation in phone booth). The fact that
Justice Harlan placed little emphasis on the first prong of the Katz test indicates that courts
should not use the first prong to bar Fourth Amendment protection. See 1 LAFAvE, supra
note 59, § 2.1(c), at 308-10 (noting that excessive reliance on subjective prong would unduly
limit Katz rule and stating that majority of Court has cautioned that reliance on subjective
expectation of privacy prong would in some situations provide inadequate Fourth Amendment
protection).
153. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 602-03 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (finding reason-
mg of Penny-Feeney unpersuasive).
154. See Umted States v. Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205, 212-13 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (rejecting
government's contentions that waste heat was in plain view, that waste heat was just like
garbage, and that FLIR device was like sniff by trained dog), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75
(1995); Young, 867 P.2d at 601-04 (rejecting Penny-Feeney court's analogies of waste heat
to garbage and FLIR device to sniff by trained dog); see also Steele, supra note 3, at 28-32,
35 (examining and rejecting Penny-Feeney court's analogies of waste heat to garbage and
FLIR device to sniff by trained dog and noting that Penny-Feeney court could not find valid
analogy to FLIR search).
155. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991) (corn-
paring waste heat to garbage), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th
Cir. 1993); see also United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Penny-
Feeney and comparing heat that defendant vented from house to garbage that defendant placed
on curb in Greenwood); United States v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir.) (following
Penny-Feeney and comparing waste heat to garbage), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994);
supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text (discussing Penny-Feeney court's analogy of
garbage to waste heat and discussing facts and holding of Greenwood).
156. See Young, 867 P.2d at 602-03 (identifying two reasons why Penny-Feeney court's
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would have escaped anyway; the defendants did not place the heat outside
with the same conscious effort required to take garbage to the curb1 57 In
contrast, the Greenwood Court relied on the fact that the defendants had
deliberately placed their garbage on the curb for a third party to retrieve."I
Second, even if the defendants did deliberately "place" the heat outside and
thereby "exposed" the heat to the FLIR, the defendants still had a reasonable
expectation of privacy m the heat." 9 The Greenwood Court stated that every-
one is aware that all members of the public have ready access to garbage bags
left for collection outside the home."6 In addition, anyone placing garbage on
the curb knows that workers will collect the garbage, throw it into a truck,
and probably take it to the public dump.16' The FLIR situations are distin-
guishable because the government uses a highly technological device to detect
the waste heat. 62 Until the government routinely uses FLIR devices to scan
private homes, people will not expect that anyone will detect and analyze heat
analogy between waste heat and garbage failed).
157 See id. (noting that heat escapes house without any deliberate participation by
defendant); Steele, supra note 3, at 30 (stating that Penny-Feeney defendants did not volun-
tarily expose heat with same conscious effort of person taking garbage to curb).
158. See United States v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (stating that defendants
put garbage on curb for express purpose of conveying garbage to third party and that defend-
ants did not have reasonable expectation of privacy m garbage because defendants put garbage
in area "particularly suited for public inspection and public consumption") (quoting
United States v Riecherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981)); see also supra note 69
(discussing Greenwood). o
159. See Umted States v Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205, 213 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that
vented heat detected by high tech devices was not analogous to abandoned garbage), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995); State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994) (en banc)
(noting that one does not expect others to detect heat escaping from one's home with sophisti-
cated infrared instruments); Steele, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that defendants in Penny-
Feeney might reasonably expect police would not use specialized commercial equipment to
detect infrared emissions that defendants vented).
160. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41 (stating that "lilt is common knowledge that
plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public") (citations omitted); see also
supra note 69 (discussing facts and holding of Greenwood).
161. See Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40-41(noting defendants expected that trash collector
would pick up garbage when defendants placed garbage on curb).
162. See Ishmael, 843 F Supp. at 213 (noting that government's use of high tech sensory
devices distinguished FLIR cases from garbage cases); Young, 867 P.2d at 602-03 (noting
relevance of government's use of sophisticated infrared instruments to view heat to determine
reasonableness of defendant's expectation of privacy); Steele, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that
government's use of specialized commercial equipment to detect infrared emissions distin-
guished venting waste heat from placing garbage on curb).
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that might vent from their house. 6 ' That heat is only accessible to those
who hire a helicopter and a FLIR operator to fly over the house and analyze
the house's heat ermssions. 6
2. Drug-Sniffing Dog Cases
The Penny-Feeney court compared the government's use of the FLIR
device to the government's warrantless use of several other sense-enhancing
devices that the Supreme Court has held permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.' 6 However, the searches at issue in each of these cases
differed from the government's use of the FLIR in Penny-Feeney "6 In
United States v Knotts,167 the Supreme Court held that the government's
monitoring of a beeper in order to track a car did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. '6 However, the Knotts Court specifically noted that the gov-
163. See Young, 867 P.2d at 602-03 (stating public did not expect government's use of
sophisticated instruments on home to detect heat); Steele, supra note 3, at 29 (suggesting that
general public did not expect government would detect heat with sophisticated device and
therefore Penny-Feeney defendants' expectation of privacy in heat was reasonable); see also
1 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 2.1(d), at 312-13 (noting importance of "customs and sensibili-
ties of the populace" in determining reasonableness of expectation of privacy under second
prong of Katz test) (quoting Note, 60 MICH. J.L. 154, 179-80 (1972)). Unfortunately, the
fact that courts determine the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy with reference to
the customs of the populace raises the possibility that the use of technology will become so
commonplace that people will no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
homes. Cf. California v Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 226 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting with
alarm that majority's holding eroded defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in home
and that rapidly increasing technology allowed increasing police surveillance in homes).
164. See Steele, supra note 3, at 29 (noting that "[flor a curious passerby to see what
Officer Char discovered [with the FLIR m Penny-Feeney], he would need to rent a helicopter
and spend at least $200 in addition to the normal rental fee").
165. See United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 226-27 (D. Haw. 1991)
(comparing government's use of FLIR to government's use of beeper in Knotts, trained dog
sniff in Place and Soils, and pen register in Smith), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney,
984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir.
1994) (stating that Supreme Court has held that fact that surveillance device allowed for
super- or extra-sensory perception was not fatal to Katz analysis and citing Dow, Knolts, and
Place for proposition that use of surveillance device with super- or extra-sensory capability
is not fatal to Katz analysis); supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (discussing Penny-
Feeney court's use of analogies and discussing facts and holdings of Smith, I'zotts, and
Place).
166. See Steele, supra note 3, at 32-34 (discussing invalidity of Knotts, Place, and Smith
as analogies to Penny-Feeney).
167 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
168. United States v Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding government's use of
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ernment had only used the beeper to track the defendant's vehicle on open
roads, had not monitored the beeper once the vehicle came to rest on the
defendant's premises, and had only gamed information that would have been
available using visual surveillance. 69 In contrast, the government's use of
the FLIRP m Penny-Feeney obtained information about the interior of the
defendants' home that the government could not have obtained through
visual surveillance. 7" The Supreme Court then decided another case involv-
ing a beeper, United States v Karo. In Karo, the Umted States Supreme
Court found the government's monitoring of a beeper in a private resi-
dence to be unconstitutional."T The Penny-Feeney court did not acknowl-
edge Karo, which provides a much better analogy than does Knotts."3
The Penny-Feeney court also compared the FLIR device to the pen
register that the government had used in Smith v Maryland, 4 which the
Supreme Court found did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 5 However,
the Smith Court relied on the fact that the defendant knew that he had to
"convey" the telephone numbers that he dialed to the telephone company to
beeper did not invade any legitimate expectation of privacy on defendant's part); see supra
note 74 (discussing facts and holding of Knotts).
169. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282-85 (noting that beeper was not used m any way to
reveal information about movement of drum within cabin or to reveal any information not
visible to naked eye from outside cabin).
170. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (stating that infrared
device produces image of inside of home that otherwise is protected by home's walls); see
also Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 223).
171. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
172. See United States v Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714, 718 (1984) (holding that govern-
ment's monitoring of beeper, when beeper revealed information that government could not
have obtained through visual surveillance, violated defendant's legitimate expectation of
privacy in residence); see also supra note 74 (discussing facts and holding of Karo).
173. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220, 226 (D. Haw. 1991) (citing
Knotts for proposition that government's use of beeper was not a search but not acknowledg-
ing Karo), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); Young,
867 P.2d at 601-02 (comparing government's use of beeper in Karo with government's use
of FLIR device); see also United States v Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing
Knotts for proposition that fact that device allowed "super- or extra-sensory perception" did
not defeat Katz analysis, but not acknowledging Karo); mfra notes 202-07 and accompanying
text (discussing analogy of Karo to FLIR situation).
174. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
175. See Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding government's use
of pen register to record numbers defendant dialed from his home did not violate Fourth
Amendment); Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 226 (comparing government's use of FLIR to
government's use of pen register in Smith); see also supra note 73 (discussing facts and
holding of Smith).
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place a call.'76 Therefore, the Smith Court concluded that the defendant
manifested no actual or legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers."7
In contrast, the defendants in Penny-Feeney did not deliberately expose to
the public the heat that the defendants had generated inside the defendants'
house. 178
The Penny-Feeney court also argued that the government's use of the
FLIR device was analogous to the government's use of a trained drug-
sniffing dog.i79 This analogy is inappropriate. 's0 The cases that hold that a
sniff by a trained canine is not a search rely heavily on the fact that the only
possible information that the sniff can reveal is the presence of a narcotic.''
176. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742-43 (stating that telephone users know they must transmit
telephone numbers to telephone company to complete calls).
177 See d. at 742-46 (stating that defendant had no actual expectation of privacy,m
numbers because of public's knowledge that telephone users must "convey" numbers to tele-
phone company and stating that if defendant did have actual expectation of privacy that
expectation was not reasonable because defendant voluntarily "exposed" numbers to public).
178. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 602-03 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (noting that heat
escapes house without any deliberate participation by defendant); Steele, supra note 3, at 30
(stating that Penny-Feeney defendants did not voluntarily expose heat with same conscious
effort of person putting garbage on curb). The same issues arose in the ontext of the analogy
between waste heat and garbage. See supra notes 153-64 and accompanying text (discussing
analogy between waste heat and garbage and noting that defendants did not voluntarily expose
heat, but even if they did, defendants did not have reason to expect third party would collect
and analyze heat).
179. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 226-27 (comparing government's use of FLIR
to government's use of trained dog sniff m Sols); see also United States v Ford, 34 F.3d
992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating that Supreme Court has held that fact that surveillance
device permitted "super- or extra-sensory perception" is not fatal to Katz analysis and citing
Place, canine-sniff case); United States v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir.) (finding
FLIR use was analogous to warrantless use of trained drug-sniffing dogs and citing Place),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text (discussing
Penny-Feeney court's use of canine-sniff analogy and discussing holdings and facts of Solis
and Place).
180. See United States v. Ishmael, 843 F Supp. 205, 213 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (identifying
two reasons for failure of analogy of dog sniff to FMR), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995);
Young, 867 P.2d at 603-04 (stating that canine sniff is unique investigative procedure and that
Penny-Feeney court incorrectly compared FLIR to canine sniff in Solis); Steele, supra note
3, at 30-32 (stating that Penny-Feeney court incorrectly relied on Soils and Place and that
"[tlhe greater possibility of intrusion, the difference in training, and the relative novelty of
FLIR devices invalidated the [Penny-Feeney] court's analogy to the canine sniff").
181. See United States v Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (noting that dog sniff reveals
only presence or absence of narcotics); United States v Solis, 536 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir.
1976) (noting that government did not investigate indiscriminately using dog sniffs but
directed investigation solely to particular illegal substance); see also Steele, supra note 3, at
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In the FLIR situation, the FLIR scan also can reveal information about the
house and its occupants that is not illegal.in Furthermore, the Penny-Feeney
line of cases relies on United States v Place,i m which the Supreme Court
emphasized that the canine sniff is a unique investigative device.1" As such,
courts should not compare the dog sniff to the FLIR device." The Penny-
Feeney court also inappropriately relied on United States v Solis,"8 in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the gov-
ernment's use of a trained dog to sniff the defendant's semi-trailer parked at
a gas station was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment." The
government's use of the FLIR in the Penny-Feeney line of cases differs from
the government's use of the dog sniff in Solis because the government used
the FLIR to scan residences." Courts could craft a better analogy by using
United States v Thomas,89 in which the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that a dog sniff at the door of the defendant's resi-
dence constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment."9 The court based
31 (stating that Place Court held that "a quick, nonintrusive test that reveals that only
contraband is present is not a search under the Fourth Amendment" and stating that Solis
court noted that government directed investigation by dog sniff only to particular contraband).
182. See Steele, supra note 3, at 31 (noting that trained drug-sniffing dog detects only
odor of drugs, while FLIR device reveals any source of heat, legal or illegal).
183. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
184. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (noting that "canie sniff is sui generis" and stating that
Court was "aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in the manner
in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure"); see also supra note 75 (discussing Place).
185. See State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603-04 (Wash. 1994) (en bane) (finding Penny-
Feeney court's analogy of FLIR to dog sniff inappropriate, partly because Supreme Court
declared dog sniffs unique m Place).
186. 536 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1976).
187 See Solis, 536 F.2d at 882-83 (holding government's use of trained, drug-sniffing
dogs was not prohibited search under Fourth Amendment); supra notes 77-82 and accom-
panying text (discussing Solis); see also United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. 220,
226-27 (D. Haw. 1991) (comparing dog sniff in Solis to FLIR device), aff'd sub nom. United
States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993); Young, 867 P.2d at 603-04 (stating that
Penny-Feeney court mistakenly compared dog sniff in Solis to FLIR device); see also supra
notes 76-83 and accompanying text (discussing Penny-Feeney court's comparison of FLIR
device to dog sniff in Solis).
188. See Young, 867 P.2d at 601 (noting that Supreme Court has drawn distinction
between use of sensory-enhancement devices in homes from their use m other places); see
also supra text accompanying notes 34-53 (discussing Penny-Feeney); supra note 78 (discus-
sing Soils).
189. 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985).
190. See United States v Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
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its holding on the fact that the defendant had a heightened expectation of
privacy within his dwelling.' 9
3. Aerial "Plain View" Cases
The aerial "plain view" cases have held that if an item can be seen from
plain view with the naked eye, then viewing from the air does not constitute
a search."9 Cases have extended this doctrine to include the use of tele-
scopic lenses and high-technology cameras - items that enhance the vision
of the naked eye.'93 United States v Dow Chemical Co., 9 4 which involved
a high-technology camera, may be the Penny-Feeney court's best analogy,
although the court did not stress the analogy 195 Both the mapping camera
and the FLIR device enhance visibility but do not reveal intimate detail."9
In both cases, the device was available for public rental.'97 However, courts
might distinguish Dow on the basis that FLIR devices are not as common as
cameras, even mapping cameras. 198 Also, courts could distinguish Dow by
canine sniff at defendant's door constituted search under Fourth Amendment); supra note 132
(discussing Thomas); see also State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 603-04 (Wash. 1994) (en bane)
(arguing that government's use of dog sniff in Thomas is better analogy to government's use
of FLIR than dog sniff in Solis).
191. See Thomas, 757 F.2d at 1367 (holding canine sniff at defendant's door constituted
search under Fourth Amendment because of defendant's heightened expectation of privacy
withm his home).
192. See United States v Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding that Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit police traveling in public airways from seeing what was visible
with naked eye within curtilage of home); see also United States v Ishmael, 843 F Supp.
205, 211 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (stating that naked-eye aerial observations of property do not
violate Fourth Amendment, even if property is within curtilage of home), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 75 (1995).
193. See Dow Chemical Co. v United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that
government's taking aerial photographs of industrial plant complex with high-magnification
mapping camera from navigable airspace did not violate Fourth Amendment); see also supra
note 114 (discussing facts and holding of Dow).
194. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
195. See Steele, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that Dow was best authority by which Penny-
Feeney court could have supported its position); see also United States v Penny-Feeney, 773
F Supp. 220, 227-28 (D. Haw. 1991) (discussing Ciraolo and Riley but not citing Dow),
aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
196. See Dow, 476 U.S. at 229-30 (discussing facts of case); Penny-Feeney, 773 F
Supp. at 223-24 (discussing facts of case).
197 See Steele, supra note 3, at 38 (noting that devices government used m Dow and
in Penny-Feeney were available to public).
198. See id. (stating that "it might be hoped that the Court would hold that although
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noting that the FLIR makes heat - which the naked eye cannot see at all -
isiible.1" Making the mvisible visible goes far beyond simply enhancing the
ability of the naked eye.' Courts should be careful in further expanding the
"plam view" doctrine to include items that make visible things that are
normally mvisible to the naked eye, because each expansion erodes Fourth
Amendment protection."°
C. Suggestions for Alternate Analogies
United States v Karo'0 offers perhaps the best analogy to the govern-
ment's use of the FLIR device.' °3 In both Karo and Penny-Feeney, the
government obtained information about the interior of a home that the gov-
ernment would not have been able to obtain without the dewce.2 4 The
beeper in Karo provided no more information than the FLIR device; in fact,
the FLIR device provided more information than the beeper.' °5 Also, both
situations involved a private residence, wlch generates the highest expecta-
tion of privacy ' The Penny-Feeney court should have followed the Karo
infrared detectors are publicly available, they are not as ubiquitous as cameras and thus may
not be used for warrantless searches").
199. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 223-24 (noting that defendants' residence
appeared dark without FLIR but that FUR revealed bright white areas of escaping heat).
200. See Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (noting that fact
that human vision was enhanced somewhat did not give rise to Fourth Amendment problems).
201. See id. (stating that "[ilt may well be that surveillance of private property by
using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such
as satellite technology, nught be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant"); State v
Young, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (warning that "as technology races ahead
with ever increasing speed" public's right to privacy may erode without public's awareness
and therefore courts should safeguard Fourth Amendment rights).
202. 486 U.S. 705 (1984); see supra note 74 (discussing Karo's facts and holding).
203. See Young, 867 P.2d at 601-02 (comparing government's use of beeper m Karo to
government's use of FLIR device); see also supra text accompanying note 173 (commenting
that Karo was better analogy). For farther suggestions of analogies to the FLIR device, see
Steele, supra note 3, at 35-38.
204. See Young, 867 P.2d at 602 (analogimng FLIR situation to situation in Karo).
205. See id. (stating that FLIR was at least as intrusive as beeper m Karo).
206. See Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting that home is area where person has constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy); id. at 351 n.8 (stating that courts have appeared to agree that private home is
constitutionally protected area); see also State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 601 (Wash. 1994)
(en banc) (discussing status of homes m federal constitutional jurisprudence); 1 LAFAVE,
supra note 59, § 2.3, at 378 (discussing protected nature of residential premises and stating
"one's dwelling has generally been viewed as the area most resolutely protected by the Fourth
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Court and held that the warrantless FLIR scan was a search that violated the
Fourth Amendment.
IV Suggested Approach
The government's use of the FLIR device, if abused, could pose serious
risks to citizens' Fourth Amendment rights.' However, the FLIR is helpful
in tracking down indoor marijuana-growing operations, among other uses.2 8
Therefore, the government should find a way to use the FLIR device without
creating constitutional problems. 9 The government can use the FLIR effec-
tively without weakening the Fourth Amendment protection provided to
citizens.210 In many of the cases involving the FLIR, previous information
existed that led the police to suspect that the defendant was conducting an
indoor marijuana-growing operation. 211 Furthermore, use of the FLIR
device requires planning; the police must rent a helicopter and the device and
find a FLIR operator.212 To ensure that the government does not use the
FLIR for random surveillance, courts or legislatures should require the
police to obtain a warrant before using the FLIR.213 Courts could require
Amendment").
207 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating that citizens may face erosion of
privacy rights as result of increasing technology).
208. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text (discussing usefulness of FLIR
device).
209. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text (suggesting ways government can use
FLIR device to help citizens outside law enforcement context).
210. See mfra notes 214-20 and accompanying text (suggesting that courts could require
standard lower than probable cause for prior authorization or that legislature could enact
statute prescribing procedures government should follow).
211. See, e.g., United States v Ford, 34 F 3d 992, 993 (1lth Cir. 1994) (noting that
police received informant's tip and that government based warrant on information from
thermal inager and "other sources"); United States v Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8th Cir.)
(noting that police had information about packages defendant received and records of unusu-
ally high electrical usage), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 664 (1994); United States v Ishmael, 843
F Supp. 205, 213-14 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (summarizing information police gathered other than
thermal scan), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 75 (1995); United States v Penny-Feeney, 773 F
Supp. 220, 221-23, 228-29 (D. Haw. 1991) (describing extensive evidence other than mfor-
mation police gained from FLIR scan and finding probable cause for warrant absent
mfbrmation police gained from FLIR scan), aff'd sub nom. United States v Feeney, 984 F.2d
1053 (9th Cir. 1993); State v Young, 867 P.2d 593, 595 (Wash. 1994) (en banc) (summar-
izing information police gathered other than thermal scan).
212. See Penny-Feeney, 773 F Supp. at 223 (noting that police officer contracted with
outside company to arrange FLR overflight).
213. See supra note 4 (noting danger of erosion of Fourth Amendment rights).
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that the government satisfy some lower standard of evidence - such as
reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause - before courts can author-
ize a FLIR scan.214 The government should be able to meet this lower
burden because in most situations justifying FLIR use there has been prior
evidence of illegal activity 215 Moreover, ample time will exist to secure a
warrant.2 6 If courts are unwilling to act, as they seem to be, given the
holding in Penny-Feeney, legislatures should enact statutes requiring the
government to comply with certain procedures before using the FLIR.17
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968218 (the Act) pro-
hibits wiretapping and electromc eavesdropping except pursuant to certain
procedures.2i9 Section 2516 of the Act specifies that a judge may authorize
wiretapping when the requested wiretapping may provide evidence of,
among other things, any offense involving the manufacture of marijuana.'
Legislatures could specify the same authorization procedures for FLIR use.
If the courts or legislatures required a lower evidentiary standard for a
warrant for FUR use, any FLIR scan would have at least some form of prior
authorization, which is vital to safeguard citizens' Fourth Amendment
rights. 221
214. See United States v Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718-19 n.5 (1984) (noting possibility of
court's requiring that government show only reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause
before execution of beeper monitoring search); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 59, § 2.1(e),
at 318 (noting that Court m Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), allowed search
upon showing of less than probable cause, but required that magistrate determine standard had
been met). For a general discussion of whether courts should require a warrant based on full
probable cause before every search, see 1 LAFAvE, supra note 59, § 2.1(e), at 317-20.
215. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting that government usually has
evidence of illegal activity absent information from thermal scan).
216. See supra text accompanying note 212 (noting that FLIR scans require planning).
217 See 1 LAFAvE, supra note 59, § 2.1(b), at 306 (noting that Congress enacted
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which prohibits wiretapping and
electronic surveillance except m accordance with specified procedures).
218. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
219. See id. (specifying procedures and standards for authorization and use of wire-
tapping devices and for disclosure of information obtained).
220. Id. at § 2516(1)(e).
221. See Katz v United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967) (stating that courts must
unpose prior restraint on government, not trust government to limit searches itself).

